Abstract-Key establishment in wireless sensor networks is a challenging problem for the constrained energy, memory, and computational capabilities of the sensor nodes. In this paper, focusing on the management of encryption keys in Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks(HWSN), We propose a novel distributed key management scheme based on Shamir secret sharing scheme and deployment knowledge (HSNKMS). In HSNKMS, the sensor nodes are divided into some group, inner group pairwise keys are setup by random key distribution scheme, and intergorup pairwise keys are established by Shamir secret sharing scheme. We describe the details of our algorithm and compare it with other proposed schemes. Comparison and theory analysis show that the proposed scheme outperforms lots of the existing key establishment schemes in terms of wireless sensor networks security and key connectivity.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of a large number of sensors that are capable of probing the environment and reporting the collected data to a sink node using wireless channels. Security is critical for a variety of WSNs applications, such as home security monitoring and military deployments. In these applications, each sensor node is highly vulnerable to many kinds attacks, both physical and digital, due to each node's cost and energy limitation, wireless communication, and exposed location, which make the task of incorporating security in WSNs a challenging problem [1] . In WSNs security, the key management problem is one of the most important and the most fundamental aspects. An effective key management scheme is the basis of other security mechanism such as secure routing, secure localization, confidentiality, authenticity, availability, and integrity.
Recently, the key management problem has been extensively studied in the context of WSNs. Lots of results have been attained [2, [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . Some of these schemes depend upon public-key algorithms [2, 11, 12] . However, the low memory and energy physical constraints of sensor nodes limit the practice of this key management scheme in the real world. The key predistribution is another class of solution using symmetric encryption techniques to this problem. Previous research on sensor network security mainly focus on homogeneous sensor networks where all sensor nodes have the same capabilities. However, recent research work [3] has shown that the connectivity and lifetime of the sensor network can be substantially improved if a small number of sensor nodes have more energy capacity and transmission capability.
In this paper, we present a novel solution to the problem of key management in HWSNs. Specifically, we propose a scheme for HWSNs based on deployment knowledge (HSNKMS). The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related works. In Section 3 the deployment model and HWSN structure are introduced. the Shamir secret sharing scheme is described in Section 4. The detail of HSNKMS is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 evaluates the HSNKMS. Finally, we summarize our results in Section 7.
II. RELATED WORK
Eschenauer and Gligor proposed a random key predistribution scheme: before deployment, each sensor receives a random subset of keys from a large key pool. Two neighboring nodes find one common key within their subsets and use the key as their shared secret keys [4] . This scheme cannot guarantee the connectivity and the exclusive key pairing between any pair of nodes in a network. The reason is that each node is randomly supplied with some secret keys from a large key pool, and then it tries to find some direct or indirect common keys with its neighbors in certain probability. The Eschenauer-Gligor scheme is further improved by Chan, Perrig, et al. [5] , by Liu D, Ning P. [6] . Another effort by Du W, Deng J et al. present a key management scheme using deployment knowledge [7] . Sencun Zhu et al. proposed LEAP [8] . LEAP supports the establishment of four types of keys for each sensor node.
978-1-4244-5143-2/10/$26.00 ©2010 IEEE LEAP boosts the network resiliency to node capture while it has not sufficient scalability. LEAP is based on the assumption that every node is innocent and the group key can be kept secret during sometime at beginning. If the group key is disclosed, the whole WSNs will be destroyed.
Mohamed F. Younis et al. proposed SHELL [9] based on Exclusion Basis System (EBS). SHELL assumes that each cluster head can communicate with the command node, which is not fit for the real world. Since the gateways are responsible for monitoring sensors' behaviors and storing the cluster nodes' key, the compromised gateways will be a menace to the whole networks.
Perrig A, Szewczyk R, et al. proposed SPINS [10] . In SPINS, each sensor node shares a secret key with the base station. Two sensor nodes cannot directly establish a secret key. However they can use the base station as a trusted third party to set up the secret key. SPINS put too much dependence on the base station, need to communicate to the base station frequently, and is not immune to DOS attack.
Previous work mainly considers the symmetric key cryptography. Zhang Yanchao et al. proposed a LocationBased Compromise-Tolerant Security Mechanisms for Wireless Sensor Networks [11] , Which presented approaches to establish a shared key between any two network nodes using Identity-based cryptography. Xiaojiang Du et al. [2] proposed a routing-driven elliptic curve cryptography based key management scheme for HWSNs. Ronald Watro et al. [12] described the design and implementation of public-key-(PK)-based protocols that allow authentication and key agreement between a sensor network and a third party as well as between two sensor networks. However, due to resource constraints on sensor nodes, it is not feasible for sensors to use traditional pair-wise key establishment techniques such as public key cryptography and key distribution center.
III. BACKGROUND: HWSN STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT MODEL

A. HWSN Structure
We consider an HWSN consisting of two types of sensor nodes: [2] a small number of cluster head (CH ) nodes and common sensor (CS) nodes. Both CH and CS are powered by batteries and have limited energy supply. We list the assumptions of HWSN below: 1) Assume that if an adversary compromises a CS node, she can obtain all key material, data, and code stored on that node. 2) CH nodes have more powerful communication capability. It is reasonable to assume that powerful CH nodes are equipped with the technology. The number of CH nodes in an HWSN is small and CH nodes can communicate with Sink nodes directly. Hence, the total cost of CH nodes in an HSN is low.
3) The sink is trusted.
B. Deployment Model
The deployment model proposed is based on the work of Wenliang Du et al. [7] We assume that sensor nodes are static once they are deployed and divide the target deployment area into k sub-fields. The sensor node can reside at any point of this sub-field according to a certain Probability Distribution Function (PDF). We define the central point of the sub-field as deployment point. In practice, it is quite common that nodes are deployed in groups. As an example, let us consider the case where sensor nodes are deployed by dropping them from a helicopter. The deployment point is the location of the helicopter. We also define final point as the point location where a sensor finally locates [7] . Fig. 1 shows the Deployment field and Sub-fields.
In this paper, we assume such a group-based deployment, and model the deployment knowledge in the following: 1) We divide the target deployment area into k sub-field, and each sub-field has its own ID.
2) N CS nodes and M CH nodes to be deployed are divided into k equal size groups so that each group, j G , for 1, , j k = , is deployed from the deployment point, and each group has its own unique ID. For example, in Fig.1 .we divide the target deployment area into k = 9 subfields, and all the CS nodes and CH nodes are divided into 9 groups too. 3) We will deploy the CS nodes and CH nodes with group ID into the sub-field with the same ID at the sub-field's own deployment point. 4) We assume that the deployment distribution for any nodes in group j G follows a two-dimension Normal Distribution. THE SHAMIR SECRET SHARING SCHEME The Shamir secret sharing scheme [13] is a scheme to distribute a secret K into d users in such a way that any subset of t users can cooperate to reconstruct the secret K but MType is the type of a message; Q Nonce is a nonce generated by Q (a nonce is an unpredictable bit string, usually used to achieve freshness).
HSNKMS consists of three phases: key pre-distribution, pairwise keys establishment in each group, and intergroup key establishment. The first two phases are exactly the same as E-G scheme [4] .
Step 1: Key Pre-distribution Scheme.
This phase is conducted offline before the sensor nodes are deployed. Fig.1 ., we need to generate 12 intergroup keys.
Step 2:Pairwise Keys Establishment of Inner Group nodes. After deployment, each node need to discover whether it shares any keys with its neighbors. Each node broadcasts a message containing the indices of the keys it has. Each neighboring node can use these broadcast messages to find out if there exists a common key it shares with the broadcasting nodes. If such a key exists, then the pairwise key is set up. As a result, the entire sensor network forms a Key-Sharing graph G [7] ， which is constructed in the following manner: for any two node i n and j n ,there exists an edge between them if and only if nodes i n and j n have at least one common key, and node i n and j n can reach each other within the wireless transmission range. It is possible that there exists two neighboring nodes which cannot find any common keys between them. In this case, they can always find a secure path in G from i n and j n .
Then, i n first generates a random key and send the key to j n by the secure path.
Step 3: Intergroup Key Establishment After step 2, the inner communication of each group is secure, but the inter communication between neighbouring group is not secure.
The intergroup key between group u G and group v G is set up as follows. 
VI. EVALUATION OF HSNKMS
We analyze the HSNKMS by fours metrics [14] : 1) Key connectivity. The connectivity refers to the ratio of the number of nodes in the largest isolated component in the final key-sharing graph to the size of the whole work. As which can be seen form the Fig 2 [4] , with increasing of the number of the key ring, the probability of sharing at least one key between two nodes is increasing too. When the size of key ring is equal, the smaller the key pool j S is, the larger the probability is. In HSNKMS，the key pool S is divided into k group，and j S S << , so we can obviously conclude that the key connectivity of HSNKMS is better than E-G scheme when the size of key ring is equal. 2) Resilience against node capture. We assume that an adversary can mount a physical attack on a sensor node after it is deployed and read secret information from its memory. A scheme's resilience toward node capture can be evaluated by estimating the fraction of total network communications that are compromised by a capture of x nodes not including the communications in which the compromised nodes are directly involved.
Let m be the size of the key ring and ' K be the communication key used for the link between two nodes that are not compromised. When any node other than these two nodes is comprised, the probability that
For example, there are 1000 sensor nodes(N=1000) to be deployed into the target field. In HSNKMS, we assume that the pool c=100000, and all the nodes is divided into 10 group, So the sub-pool 10000( 1,...,10)
.To achieve pairwise key establishment probability p=0.5, the number of keys in a node's key ring m is 83 [4] . In E-G scheme, we also assume that the key pool size S =100,000, and to achieve pairwise key establishment probability p=0.5, the number of keys in a node's key ring ' m is 263. Figure 3 shows the performance of these two schemes from which can be seen that as the number of compromised nodes increases, the fraction of affected communication links of HSNKMS is better than E-G scheme. 3) Storage requirement. In our scheme, a node needs to keep two types of keys. As can be seen from the example which we show before, a sensor need store ' m =263 keys for a network with key pool size S =100,000 to keep the key connectivity probability P=0.5 for E-G scheme. However, for HSNKMS , a sensor only need store 83 m = keys and 4 sh shares of group key. obviously, ' *4 m sh m >> + .
4) Communication cost.
In HSNKMS, the length of a secure path is shorter than the one in E-G scheme because the number of nodes in HSNKMS is smaller than that in E-G scheme. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, A novel distributed key management scheme HSNKMS based on Shamir secret sharing scheme and deployment knowledge is proposed for Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks. Our scheme has some appealing properties. HSNKMS's key connectivity is high. HSNKMS is perfectly resilient against node compromise, and need less memory to store the keys.
Several research problems are worth further studying. Firstly, if a CH node can't collect enough shares of pairwise numbers, it cannot keep connectivity with the networks. Secondly, we will try to find some new mechanism to address the key updating problem.
